Problems of allocating indivisible goods to agents in an efficient and fair manner without money have long been investigated in literature. The random assignment problem is one of them, where we are given a fixed feasible (available) set of indivisible goods and a profile of ordinal preferences over the goods, one for each agent. Then, using lotteries, we determine an assignment of goods to agents in a randomized way. A seminal paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) shows a probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism to give an ordinally efficient and envy-free solution to the assignment problem.
INTRODUCTION
Problems of allocating indivisible goods to agents in a fair and efficient manner without money have long been investigated in the literature (see, e.g., References [1-6, 17-22, 26, 28, 31] ). Suppose that we are given a fixed feasible (available) set of indivisible goods and a profile of ordinal preferences over the goods, one for each agent. Then, using lotteries, we determine an assignment of goods to agents in a randomized way. A seminal paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] shows a probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism to give an ordinally efficient and envy-free solution to the assignment problem.
In this article, we consider an extension of the random assignment problem to submodular constraints on goods in two cases:
(1) Agents have unit demands and the family of feasible sets of goods forms a family of bases of a matroid. (The original problem in Reference [5] is concerned with a matroid having only one base.) (2) Agents have multiunit demands and the set of feasible integral vectors of goods forms an integral polymatroid. (A polymatroid having only one base is treated in References [6, 18, 21] .)
We show that the approach of the PS mechanism by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] is powerful enough to solve the random assignment problem with submodular (matroidal and polymatroidal) constraints. Under the agents' ordinal preferences over goods we prove the following:
(1) The obtained PS solution for the problem with unit demands and matroidal constraints is ordinally efficient, envy-free, and weakly strategy-proof with respect to the partial order defined by the stochastic dominance relation introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] . (2) For the multiunit demand and polymatroidal constraint problem, the PS solution is ordinally efficient and envy-free but is not weakly strategy-proof in general. However, under a mild condition (that is likely to be satisfied in practice), the PS solution is a weak Nash equilibrium.
The well-known Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem on bistochastic matrices shows that every bistochastic matrix is expressed as a convex combination of permutation matrices, which plays a crucial role in implementing the PS mechanism developed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] . On the other hand, our extended probabilistic serial mechanism heavily depends on the results of submodular optimization such as the integrality of the independent flow polyhedra [8, 10] , which generalizes the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem.
The present article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain how we are motivated by the seminal article of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] . Section 3 gives some definitions and preliminaries to be used later. In Section 4, we precisely describe the random assignment problem with submodular (polymatroidal and matroidal) constraints. In Section 5, we show a procedure to find an extended PS solution in the convex hull of the feasible allocations (as an expected allocation) in an ordinally efficient and fair manner. In Section 6, we examine the issue of strategy-proofness of our solution mechanism. Section 7 shows how to design a lottery efficiently to get the desired expected allocation given in Section 5. Section 8 gives concluding remarks.
The present article is based on the authors' working papers, References [12] and [13] .
The Random Assignment Problem with Submodular Constraints on Goods 3:3 readable for those who are not very familiar with matroids and polymatroids. (Precise definitions of matroid and polymatroid will be given in Section 3.) We are interested in obtaining a general model of the random assignment problem, fully generalized in view of the state of the art in combinatorial optimization, to which the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin can naturally be extended. In the history of the developments in combinatorial optimization we have a sequence of successful generalizations of the theory of combinatorial optimization as follows (see, e.g., References [10, 27] ):
(1) Matchings in bipartite graphs (from around the 1930s). (1), (2) , and (3) to polymatroid intersection (the intersection of two polymatroids) and equivalently, submodular flows, polymatroidal flows, and independent flows (intensively from late 1970s).
(We should also mention other successful developments in the theory of combinatorial optimization such as matchings in general graphs and arborescences/branchings in directed graphs, which are not related to the motivation of our present article.) Another important theoretical development that motivated our present research is the theory of principal partitions [9, 11] , which is closely related to convex optimization over polymatroid base polyhedra.
When we found the seminal article of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] , we thought that the theory was at the stage of (1) matchings in bipartite graphs and that the PS mechanism shown in Reference [5] was closely related to the monotone algorithm in References [9] and [10, Sec. 9 .2]. Hence we felt that the results in Reference [5] could naturally be extended to the combinatorial optimization model of (4) mentioned above. Actually, we have found that the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] is powerful enough to have natural extensions to the combinatorial optimization model (4) of independent flows. The full extension of the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] is worth investigating theoretically and it must also be useful for possible applications in the future if not at present.
We hope that readers would duly recognize the potential applicability of our theoretical extensions in practice through (rather toy) examples given below. The issues of ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy-proofness will be examined later. (Let R be the set of reals, Z the set of integers, R ≥0 the set of nonnegative reals, Z ≥0 the set of nonnegative integers, R >0 the set of positive reals, and Z >0 the set of positive integers.) In the following, we give six illustrative examples, where the last two examples, Examples 2.5 and 2.6, cannot be modeled by using known PS extensions in the literature.
Example 2.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of three agents and suppose that there is only one good (object) e 0 . Each agent wants to get the good. This can be illustrated by a graph as in Figure 1(a) . Each feasible assignment can be identified with a {0, 1}-valued flow φ from N to e 0 of flow value 1 in the graph as in Figure 1(b) . Putting the set of arcs of the graph as A = {(1, e 0 ), (2, e 0 ), (3, e 0 )}, the set of feasible assignments is represented by the set of {0, 1}-valued vectors in {0, 1} A ⊂ R A as B = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}. Introducing a lottery with a probability distribution p on B, we get an expected allocation (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) with probability p 1 for (1, 0, 0), p 2 for (0, 1, 0), and p 3 for (0, 0, 1). The set of all expected allocations for all possible probability distributions p on B is the convex hull of B (see Figure 2 ). Here we do not discuss which expected solution to choose although it is well-known that the solution ( Example 2.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and suppose that we have a set E = {a, b, c} of three goods. Each agent i ∈ N wants to get one of E and has a preference order on E. Then any feasible allocation is a perfect matching in the bipartite graph G = (N , E; A) given as in Figure 3(a) . A perfect matching in G can be identified with a {0, 1}-valued flow φ in G as in Figure 3(b) , where a flow of value 1 enters every i ∈ N and a flow of value 1 leaves every e ∈ E. Let M be the set of all feasible allocations, i.e., the set of all perfect matchings of G. We regard every perfect matching in G as a {0, 1}-vector in R A . Then every lottery on M determines an expected allocation that is a vector in the convex hull Conv(M) of M in R A . Note that all the possible lotteries on M generate exactly the points of the convex hull Conv(M) in R A , which is known as the Birkhoff-von Neumann polytope of bistochastic matrices. Now the problem is how to determine a solution, a desired expected allocation in Conv(M), and to design a lottery that realizes the solution. This is exactly the model treated by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] .
Example 2.3. Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Now suppose that we have a set E = {a, b, c, d } of four goods and that because of some budget constraint only two goods from E can be offered to the agents, while each agent wants to get one good from E and has a preference order on E. Every feasible allocation for the present problem can be regarded as a {0, 1}-valued flow φ of flow value two from N to E in the bipartite graph G = (N , E; A) (given as in Figure 4 ) such that a flow of value 0 or 1 enters every i ∈ N and a flow of value 0 or 1 leaves every e ∈ E. Figure 4 shows a feasible allocation that assigns good c to agent 1 and good d to agent 2.
Here the family B of available two-element subsets of E is a typical example of a matroid base family of a uniform matroid of rank two (the precise definition will be given later). It should also be noted that this matroidal constraint can be treated as a network flow model as in Figure 5 , where every feasible allocation can be regarded as a {0, 1}-valued flow φ in the graph such that a flow of value 0 or 1 enters every i ∈ N , φ satisfies the flow conservation law at every internal vertex e ∈ E, and a flow of value two leaves the exit t, where every arc capacity is equal to one.
Example 2.4. Similarly, as in Example 2.3, we may also treat, as a matroidal constraint, the case when at most one good from {a, b}, at most one good from {c, d}, and two goods in total are 3:6 S. Fujishige et al. available. This is a matroidal constraint represented by the direct sum of rank-one uniform matroid on {a, b} and that on {c, d}. As can easily be seen, this can also be formulated as a network flow model similarly as in Example 2.3 (see Figure 6 ). Actually, these types of constraints here and in Examples 2.3 are considered by E. Budish et al. [6] as a laminar constraint, 1 which can be expressed by a directed tree from the set E of leaves toward the root (exit) t with arcs having appropriate capacities. It should further be noted that beyond the laminar constraints represented by directed trees as considered by Budish et al. [6] , we can consider any directed network from E to exit t, which represents a (poly)matroidal constraint of network type 2 .
Moreover, it should be noted that the convex hull of all the {0, 1}-valued flows is given by the set of real-valued flows in the associated network, due to the integrality property of flows in networks with integral capacity functions. This gives a basis for constructing a lottery to realize a desired solution.
Example 2.5. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and E = {a, b, c, d} as in Examples 2.3 and 2.4. Suppose that the set B of available subsets of E is that of all two-element subsets of E but {a, b}, i.e.,
This is a graphic matroid, which can be represented by a graph H = (V , E) with E being the edge set as shown in Figure 7 . Here the feasible sets in B are exactly the edge subsets that form spanning trees of H . We can consider any matroidal constraints on the set of available subsets of goods.
Example 2.6. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and E = {a, b, c, d}. Now we suppose that E is the set of types of goods and there exist multi-units of each good e ∈ E. As an example consider a polymatroidal constraint of network type shown in Figure 8 . In Figure 8 each arc is given an integer capacity, where +∞ is regarded as a sufficiently large integer. We suppose that each agent i ∈ N has a demand d (i) (the total number of goods of any types) given by d (1) = 3, d (2) = 2, and d (3) = 3, and the total amount of available goods (of any types) is equal to 7. Then every feasible allocation corresponds to an integral flow φ in the network such that (1) the flow value entering each i ∈ N is at most d (i), (2) the flow value leaving the exit t is equal to 7, and (3) φ satisfies the capacity constraint of 1 They call a laminar constraint a hierarchy. 2 Budish et al. [6] considered {0, 1}-valued flows in bipartite networks with laminar constraints on both sides of vertex sets N and E (called a bihierarchy). This model is a special case of the independent flow model with polymatroids of network type on both sets of entrances and of exits, which will precisely be defined in Section 3.
The Random Assignment Problem with Submodular Constraints on Goods 3:7 every arc and the flow conservation at every internal vertex. An integral feasible flow φ is shown in Figure 9 . An integral N × E matrix (φ(i, e) | i ∈ N , e ∈ E) gives a feasible allocation. The set B of all available good vectors is the set of vectors x ∈ Z E ≥0 defined by x (e) = i ∈N φ(i, e) (e ∈ E) for all feasible integral flows φ in the network. Set B is the set of integral bases of a polymatroid of network type, represented by the subnetwork connecting E = {a, b, c, d} with exit t. Besides such polymatroids of network type, we can consider any integral polymatroidal set (an integral base polyhedron) of available good vectors in Z E ≥0 .
DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give definitions of some concepts from the theory of matroids and polymatroids and also give preliminary lemmas and theorems to be used in the following (see, e.g., References [10, 25, 27, 30] ): Let E be a nonempty finite set. For any subset X ⊆ E, denote by χ X the characteristic vector of X in R E , i.e., χ X (e) = 1 for e ∈ X and χ X (e) = 0 for e ∈ E \ X . We also write χ e instead of χ {e } for e ∈ E.
A pair (E, ρ) of set E and a function ρ : 2 E → R ≥0 is called a polymatroid [7] if the following three conditions hold (also see References [10, 27, 30] ): 
The function ρ is called the rank function of the polymatroid (E, ρ). We assume ρ (E) > 0 in the sequel.
For a given polymatroid (E, ρ), let B(ρ)(⊆ R E ) be the base polyhedron of the polymatroid (see Reference [10] ), which is given by
where for any X ⊆ E we define x (X ) = e ∈X x (e). It should be noted that B(ρ) ⊆ R E ≥0 . Moreover, we have the following relation between the rank function ρ and the base polyhedron B(ρ).
Equations (2) and (3) determine a one-to-one correspondence between the set of rank functions ρ : 2 E → R and the set of base polyhedra B(ρ) ⊂ R E . It should be noted that the concept of the base polyhedron of a polymatroid is equivalent to that of the core of a convex game due to Shapley [29] . Also consider the lower hereditary closure of the base polyhedron B(ρ) given by
which is called the submodular polyhedron associated with polymatroid (E, ρ). The polytope
is called the independence polytope of polymatroid (E, ρ) and each vector in P (+) (ρ) is called an independent vector. Note that relation (3) holds when we replace B(ρ) by P(ρ) [respectively, P (+) (ρ)] in (3), as well, and P(ρ) uniquely determines the rank function ρ : 2 E → R (see Figure 10 ).
Given a vector x ∈ P(ρ), a subset X of E is called tight for x (or x-tight for short) if we have x (X ) = ρ (X ), and there exists a unique maximal x-tight set, denoted by sat(x ), which is equal to the union of all tight sets for x. We also have
The Random Assignment Problem with Submodular Constraints on Goods 3:9 which is the set of elements e ∈ E for which we cannot increase x (e) without leaving P(ρ). Moreover, for x ∈ P(ρ) and e ∈ sat(x ) define
The following fact is fundamental in the theory of polymatroids and submodular functions:
is, the set of x-tight sets is closed with respect to the set union and intersection.
Because of this fact, sat(x ) for x ∈ P(ρ) is the unique maximal x-tight set and dep(x, e) for e ∈ sat(x ) is the unique minimal x-tight set that includes e. (See Reference [10] for more details about these concepts and related facts.)
If the rank function ρ of a polymatroid (E, ρ) is integer-valued and satisfies ρ ({e}) ≤ 1 for all e ∈ E, then (E, ρ) is called a matroid (see, e.g., References [25, 30] ). When (E, ρ) is a matroid, define
Each I ∈ I is called an independent set and I is the family of independent sets of (E, ρ). Each B ∈ B is called a base and B is called the family of bases and consists of all maximal independent sets of (E, ρ) (maximal with respect to set inclusion). Since each of ρ, B and I uniquely determines the matroid on E, we also denote by (E, B) [or (E, I)] the matroid (E, ρ). For any polymatroid (E, ρ) with an integer-valued rank function ρ define
The following is well known (see, e.g., Reference [10] ):
exactly the set of all the characteristic vectors of bases (or independent sets) of matroid (E, ρ).
For a polymatroid (E, ρ) and a nonempty subset 
For any vector x ∈ R E and any nonempty set A ⊆ E define x A ∈ R A by x A (e) = x (e) for all e ∈ A. We have the following lemma, which will be used in Section 6.1.1. Lemma 3.3. Let P = (E, ρ) be a polymatroid. For any vectors x, y ∈ P(ρ) satisfying x (e) ≥ y(e) (∀e ∈ E \ sat(x )), we have sat(x ) ⊇ sat(y).
Proof. Suppose that we are given vectors x, y ∈ P(ρ) satisfying x (e) ≥ y(e) (∀e ∈ E \ sat(x )).
Increase the values of y(e) for all e ∈ sat(x ) as much as possible while keeping the vector within P(ρ), and let us denote by y the resulting vector in P(ρ). Then, we have sat(
Since ρ (A) = x (A), this implies ρ (B) < x (B), a contradiction. Hence ρ (A) = y (A) and (y ) A , and x A are bases of P · A = (A, ρ A ), the restriction of P to A. We thus have (y ) E\A ∈ P(ρ A ), where ρ A is the rank function of the contraction
Simple examples of polymatroids, some of which have already appeared in Section 2, are given as follows.
Uniform matroids: For a positive integer k ≤ m(= |E|) every subset of cardinality k of E is exactly a base, i.e.,
When k = m(= |E|), B consists of only one base E, which is the unique available set of goods as considered in the literature for the ordinary random assignment problem.
Graphic matroids: For a connected graph G = (V , E) with a vertex set V and an edge set E, every edge subset that forms a spanning tree of G is exactly a base, i.e., (E, B) is the graphic matroid represented by graph G = (V , E) with B being the family of edge sets of spanning trees. Note that for any X ⊆ E, the value of ρ (X ) is equal to the maximum size of cycle-free subsets of X in G.
Symmetric polymatroids: Let д : R → R be a nondecreasing concave function with д(0) = 0. Define ρ : 2 E → R by ρ (X ) = д(|X |). Then (E, ρ) is a polymatroid. Note that the concavity of д corresponds to the law of diminishing marginal utility in economics.
Linear polymatroids: Let V be a vector space. Let E be a nonempty finite set and for each e ∈ E let F e be a finite set of vectors in V . Define ρ : 2 E → R by ρ (X ) = rank( e ∈X F e ) for all X ⊆ E. Then (E, ρ) is a polymatroid with the integer-valued rank function ρ.
Polymatroids of multi-terminal network flows ([23], [10, Sec 2.2]
; also see References [9, 15] 
is a graph with a vertex set V and an arc set A, s ∈ V is a source, T ⊆ V \ {s} is a set of sink terminals, and c : A → R >0 is a capacity function of the network. We suppose that there exists no arc leaving T . A function φ : A → R ≥0 is called a feasible flow in N if it satisfies the capacity constraints
and the flow conservation constraints
where the boundary ∂φ : V → R of flow φ is defined by
Also define the outflow
Then the set of outflows ∂ − φ ∈ R T ≥0 of all feasible flows φ in N is the independence polytope, in R T ≥0 , of a polymatroid (T , ρ) on T . For any X ⊆ T , the value of rank ρ (X ) is equal to the maximum flow value from s to X in N . (It should be noted that polymatroids of network type have appeared in Examples 2.3-2.6 in Section 2, where arcs of the representing networks are reoriented.)
When the underlying graph G = (V , A) is a star such that V = {s} ∪ T and A = {(s, t ) | t ∈ T }, we have a polymatroid on T with a modular rank function ρ such that ρ (X ) = v ∈X c (s, v) for all X ⊆ T . Any polymatroid of this kind has a unique base and vice versa.
Consider a capacitated network
) with polymatroids on sets S + , S − ⊂ V . Here G is the underlying graph with vertex set V and arc set A, and S + and S − are disjoint subsets of V and are, respectively, the set of sources (entrances) and that of sinks (exits). Furthermore, we have a capacity function c : A → R ≥0 and a pair of polymatroids
where (13) is the flow capacity constraint for each arc, (14) the flow conservation constraint on each internal vertex, and (15) the polymatroidal boundary constraints on the entrance set S + and the exit set S − . The value ∂ + φ(S + )(= ∂ − φ(S − )) is called the flow value (or simply value) of the independent flow φ. We may also consider a cost function γ : A → R, which gives a problem of finding a minimum-cost independent flow in N . This is called the independent flow problem [8] and is equivalent to what is called the submodular flow problem (see Reference [10] ). We have the following integrality theorem [8, 10] , which plays a crucial role in validating our approach based on the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] .
. If c and ρ ± are integer-valued, then P * is an integral polytope, i.e., P * is a convex polytope such that every extreme point of P * is an integral vector. Moreover, the same integrality property also holds if we consider the set of independent flows of fixed integral value
DESCRIPTION OF THE RANDOM ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
Now we give a precise definition of the random assignment problem with polymatroidal constraints, and later examine the problem with matroidal constraints as a special case.
Model Description
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents and E be a set of goods. Each good e ∈ E should be considered as a type of good and the number of available good e can be more than one (see Example 2.6). Each agent i ∈ N wants to obtain a certain amount of goods of any types, denoted by d (i) ∈ Z >0 , at most in total. We refer to d (i) as the demand upper bound of agent i.
is called the demand vector. For each i ∈ N and e ∈ E let x i (e) be the number of copies of good e 3:12 S. Fujishige et al. that agent i obtains. Then we must have
for every agent i ∈ N . Let B ⊆ Z E ≥0 be the set of all available vectors of goods in the market that is given by B = B Z (ρ) for a polymatroid (E, ρ) with an integer-valued rank function ρ [see Equation (8)]. Since the sum of vectors i ∈N x i must be available in the market, we have the following constraint:
We assume that
to be the set of all functions φ : N × E → Z ≥0 such that vectors given by x i = (φ(i, e) | e ∈ E) for all i ∈ N satisfy (16) and (17) . Every φ ∈ A determines a feasible allocation
, and x i is with the ith row of P for each i ∈ N .
Consider an independent-flow network
is a complete bipartite graph with vertex bi-partition (S + , S − ) and arc set A = S + × S − , c (a) = +∞ (a sufficiently large positive integer) for all a ∈ A, (S − , ρ − ) is an integral polymatroid with rank function ρ − = ρ appearing in (17) , and (S + , ρ + ) is a polymatroid with a (modular) rank function ρ + given by ρ + (X ) = d (X ) for all X ⊆ S + = N . 4 For simplicity we also denote the present independent-flow network by N = (N , E, d, (E, ρ) ) (see Figure 11 ). Then from Theorem 3.2 we can easily see the following: Lemma 4.1. The set A is exactly the set of integer-valued independent flows φ :
Because of Theorem 3.4 and Lemma 4.1 we also have the following: 4 We may be tempted to consider a general polymatroid as (S + , ρ + ) on the set S + = N of agents instead of a modular rank function ρ + . Though the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin can formally be extended to such a general model mathematically, we cannot adapt our arguments to validate the assertions given in the sequel, especialy in Section 6. However, because of Theorem 3.2, the procedure shown in Section 7 for designing a lottery to realize any given expected allocation can be adapted even for such a general model (cf. the model with a bihierarchy structure in Reference [6] ).
The 
Ordinal Preference and Stochastic Dominance Relation
We suppose that each agent i ∈ N has an ordinal preference i over set E of types of goods 5 , which is a linear ordering of E. Let agent i's preference be given by
where {e i 1 , e i 2 , . . . , e i m } = E 6 and e i 1 is the most favorite (type of) good for agent i. Let L be the profile of preferences L i (i ∈ N ).
Since we must make a decision on how to allocate goods in a fair manner without money, we may consider a lottery, which is represented by a probability distribution p over A, i.e., p : A → R ≥0 satisfying φ ∈A p(φ) = 1. Then the expected allocation of goods is given by
where, precisely speaking, the left-hand side is the expectation of a random variable φ with its probability distribution p on A while φ appearing on the right-hand side is a variable taking on values of A. It should be noted that the set of all expected allocations E{φ} of Equation (19) for all possible probability distributions p is exactly the convex hull Conv(A) of A and that every lottery picks up a point from among Conv(A).
In the following, we use N × E matrices P to express expected allocations φ ∈ Conv(A) by identifying φ with P = (φ(i, e) | i ∈ N , e ∈ E), which is often employed in the literature. So we may write P ∈ Conv(A), for example. When φ corresponds to P, φ is sometimes written as φ P .
An efficient and fair expected allocation will be found with respect to the stochastic dominance relation (sd-dominance relation for short) sd i for each agent i ∈ N on expected allocations defined as follows. Recall that we are given a preference profile L = (L i | i ∈ N ) of (18). For any P, Q ∈ Conv(A), putting P i = (P (i, e) | e ∈ E) and Q i = (Q (i, e) | e ∈ E) for all i ∈ N , we define
We say an expected allocation P is sd-dominated by Q if we have Q i sd i P i for all i ∈ N and P Q. We say that P is ordinally efficient if P is not sd-dominated by any other expected allocation in Conv(A) (cf. Reference [5] ).
Also, we say an expected allocation P is normalized envy-free [18] with respect to preference
where d (i) is the integral demand upper bound of agent i ∈ N . 5 We often call a type of good e ∈ E as a good e in the sequel, where there is no possibility of confusion. 6 We have assumed that the preference is strict and complete, i.e., m = |E |. This makes the arguments required in the sequel easier. When we allow indifference among types of goods, we can extend the result of Katta and Sethuraman [20] to our problem setting, which will be discussed elsewhere (see Reference [14] ).
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Lottery
When designing a lottery to pick up a solution (a desired expected allocation), it is crucial to see that we have the integrality property of Conv(A) due to Corollary 4.2. Hence, given any (desired) expected allocation E{φ} in Conv(A), we need at most |N | × |E| (extreme) points in A that has positive probabilities of occurrence because of Carathéodory's theorem on convex polytopes to realize a lottery that gives the expected allocation E{φ}. Consequently, our problem becomes the following two:
(1) Find a pointφ(=E{φ}) from among the polytope Conv(A) in an ordinally efficient and fair manner according to the preference profile L = (L i | i ∈ N ). (2) Construct a lottery by finding a representation ofφ as a convex combination of integral points of polytope Conv(A). The coefficients of the convex combination provide us with positive probabilities of a probability distribution over A that leads us toφ = E{φ} in Equation (19) .
It heavily depends on the structure of the set A of feasible allocations whether we can find a desired expected solutionφ and construct a lottery to realizeφ in a computationally efficient way. Fortunately, it follows from Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 4.2 that A is the independent flow polytope and has a nice combinatorial structure as shown in the literature (see, e.g., Reference [10] ). We will see that the PS mechanism by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] works surprisingly well for these general problem settings with submodular constraints.
Brief Historical Remarks
The problem considered here includes the following as special cases:
(a) The ordinary random assignment problem considered in the literature is mostly the case where d = 1 ∈ Z N >0 and B = {1} ⊆ Z E >0 (e.g., References [4, 5, 20] ). Here 1 denotes a vector of all ones of appropriate dimension (determined by the context). (b) Kojima [21] , Aziz [2] , and Heo [18] considered a multiunit demand case where d ∈ Z N >0 and B = {b} ⊆ Z E >0 for some b ∈ Z E >0 .
Note that when B is a singleton set as in (a) and (b) above, the underlying (poly)matroid (E, ρ) has the unique base and the rank function ρ is modular.
FINDING AN ORDINALLY EFFICIENT AND FAIR EXPECTED ALLOCATION
We first show a procedure, Algorithm 1, which is an extension of the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] and will then show that the computed point in Conv(A) is an ordinally efficient and fair expected allocation. Let us define the base x * P ∈ B(ρ) associated with an allocation P ∈ Conv(A) by
Recall that for each i ∈ N agent i's preference is given by (18) , where {e i 1 , e i 2 , · · · , e i m } = E and e i 1 is the most favorite (type of) good for agent i, and L is the profile of preferences L i (i ∈ N ). Based on the collection (a multiset) of the first (most favorite) elements e i 1 of all agents i ∈ N , define a nonnegative integral vector We also denote the random assignment problem by
During the execution of the following algorithm, the current preference lists L i may get shorter because of removal of exhausted (or saturated) types of goods. Also note that S p is the set of types of goods saturated at stage p.
ALGORITHM 1: Extended PS Solution 7
Input: A random assignment problem RA = (N , E, L, d, (E, ρ) ). Output: An expected allocation P : N × E → R ≥0 .
Step 0: For each i ∈ N put x i ← 0 ∈ R E (the zero vector), and x * ← 0 ∈ R E . Put S 0 ← ∅, p ← 1, and λ 0 ← 0.
Step 2:
, then put p ← p + 1 and go to Step 1.
Otherwise (ρ (S p ) = ρ (E)) put P (i, e) ← x i (e) for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E. Return P.
As in Reference [5] , the parameter t in Equation (24) can be considered as time, and each agent i ∈ N eats the current top good e i 1 at rate d (i) per unit time.
Examples
To see the behavior of Algorithm 1, let us consider two illustrative examples given as follows: Example I (A graphic matroidal constraint and unit demands): Let us consider a family B of feasible sets given by
This is a graphic matroid and B is the family of edge subsets of spanning trees of the graph shown as Figure 7 in Example 2.5.
Suppose that preferences of all agents are given as follows:
7 Katta and Sethuramann [20] used the term "extended PS," and we also adopt the same term, hoping no confusion.
Also suppose that every agent has a unit demand, i.e., d = 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1 
Hence x * P = (3/4, 1/4, 3/4, 1/4). The following example has a polymatroidal constraint and multiunit demands and supplies: Example II: Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and E = {a, b, c, d} again. Let (E, ρ) be a polymatroid with a rank function given by
Note that (E, ρ) here is a symmetric polymatroid. Suppose that preferences of all agents are the same as Example I but E = {a, b, c, d} should be regarded as a set of types of goods. Let a demand vector be given by d = (4, 2, 1, 1) ∈ Z N . Then by Algorithm 1 we have P ∈ R N ×E ≥0 , as an N × E matrix, given as follows: , which are the restriction of x * P on T p = S p \ S p−1 for p = 1, 2, are given by
Hence x * P = (4, 19/7, 9/7, 0). Note that ∅, {a}, {a, b, c}, and {a, b, c, d}(= sat(x * P )) are tight sets for x * P .
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Ordinal Efficiency
The following theorem can be shown in a very similar way as the corresponding one in Reference [5] . However, it can be seen that the given proof heavily depends on the underlying submodularity structure, especially the one used for the arguments in Reference [9] .
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 1 computes an expected allocation in Conv(A) that is ordinally efficient.
Proof. By Algorithm 1 we get an expected allocation P in Conv(A) together with a chain S 0 = ∅ ⊂ S 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ S p = E. Let Q be an arbitrary expected allocation in Conv(A) and suppose that Q = P or Q sd-dominates P. It suffices to prove Q = P.
At the qth execution of Step 1 of Algorithm 1, define
Let us denote e i 1 (the top element in current L i ) at the qth execution of Step 1 by e i 1 (q) and suppose that for some integer q * ≥ 1 we have
and we execute the q * th Step 1. Then, because of Step 1 of Algorithm 1 we have
Since Q = P or Q sd-dominates P, it follows from Equation (28) that Q (i, e i 1 (q * )) ≥ P (i, e i 1 (q * )) for all i ∈ F q * . Hence from Equations (28) and (29) we must have
since we have i ∈F q * Q (i, e i 1 (q * )) ≤ ρ (S q * ) − ρ (S q * −1 ). Here note that
Now, note that when q * = 1, Equation (28) is void (and thus holds). Hence, by induction on q = 1, . . . ,p, we have shown Q = P.
Envy-freeness
Recall the definition of normalized envy-freeness given in Section 4.2. We have the following theorem on normalized envy-freeness of the extended PS mechanism. The proof is actually a direct adaptation of the one given by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] and Schulman and Vazirani [28] for existing problem settings (also see Reference [18] ). It should be noted that by Algorithm 1 every agent i ∈ N eats d (i) units of goods per unit time, which is equivalent to considering d (i) copies of every agent i ∈ N such that each copy of agent i has the same preference as agent i but has a unit demand.
Theorem 5.2. Algorithm 1 computes an expected allocation P that is normalized envy-free.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any i ∈ N and k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we have
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When good e i k is removed after an execution of Step 1, all goods e i ( = 1, . . . , k ) have been removed from E. It follows that for all j ∈ N the time spent by agent j to eat e i ( = 1, . . . , k ) given by the sum of possible values goods e i ( = 1, . . . , k ) is within t i k . Hence we must have
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
It is known that the extension of the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin to the case of multiunit demands cannot be weakly strategy-proof in general [3, 6, 18, 21] . Therefore, our polymatroidal extension is not weakly strategy-proof in general either. 8 Note that a mechanism M is weakly strategy-proof if for every input preference profile L the mechanism M gives a solution (an expected allocation) P such that for each agent i ∈ N every misreport of agent i's preference results in a solution Q satisfying that Q i does not sd-dominate P i for i. Here the strategy-proofness is concerned with the mechanism.
Weak Nash Equilibria
Let us consider the concept of a weak Nash equilibrium, which is a property of the obtained solution. For a given input profile we say that the solution P obtained by the mechanism M is a weak Nash equilibrium if for each agent i ∈ N every misreport of agent i's preference results in a solution Q, satisfying that Q i does not sd-dominate P i for i. That is, for a weak Nash equilibrium P, no agent i can improve her expected allocation P i with respect to the sd-dominance relation by any misreport of her preference L i .
We examine our polymatroidal extension and give a certain sufficient condition 9 for our solution to be a weak Nash equilibrium. The result, Theorem 6.3, given below seems to be new even for the ordinary multiunit demand case where the base polyhedron consists of a single base, i.e., B(ρ) = {b} for some b ∈ Z E >0 . In Section 6.2 we also prove the weak strategy-proofness in the special case of unit demands and matroidal supplies (shown in Reference [13] ).
Lemmas.
We first prepare two lemmas to prove Theorem 6.3 concerned with a condition for our solution to be a weak Nash equilibrium.
Let us consider the "eating process" (due to Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] ). By Algorithm 1 we have critical times
computed by Equation (24), where
by removing all the saturated types of goods from L.
For each time t with λ k ≤ t ≤ λ k+1 for k ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, we put
, 8 Schulman and Vazirani [28] showed strategy-proofness of the PS mechanism under lexicographic preferences. It is left for future research to examine how their results can be adapted to our problem settings. 9 The condition is very likely to hold for practical problems with a large number of agents.
where
with e i 1 being the top element (type of good) of current L i t . We put x * 0 = 0. Note that we have sat(
Now, suppose that agent 1 ∈ N has a preference list L 1 and misreports her preference asL 1 For any original object p (a parameter, a vector,  etc. ) defined under preference profile L, let us denote byp the object p defined under misreported preference profileL.
For each e ∈ E, define N P (e) = {i ∈ N | P (i, e) > 0}. For each e ∈ E, let t (e) be the time when good e is exhausted (or saturated). Also, for each e ∈ E and i ∈ N P (e), let t i 0 (e) be the time when agent i starts eating good e (or the time when e becomes the top element of current L i ).
with P (1, a) > 0 for some integers s ≥ 0 and s ≥ 1. Suppose thatt (a) > t (a). Then, the following three statements hold during the execution of Algorithm 1 with current time t < t (a). 
We can easily see from Algorithm 1 and the definition of L andL that (a) implies
, which implies (b). Moreover, (c) follows from (b) and Lemma 3.3, where we restrict the ground set of polymatroid (E, ρ) to E \ {a} since a is not saturated for both x * t andx * t for t < t (a) by the assumption. Also (d) easily follows from (a) (for all t ∈ [0, t (a))).
Hence it suffices to show that (a) holds for all t ∈ [0, t (a)), by induction on the indices k of critical times λ k andλ k . First, note that (a) holds for t ∈ [0, min{λ 1 
We consider the following three cases (A), (B), and (C): (A) Suppose that (a) holds for all t ∈ [0, λ k ) for some k ≥ 1 with λ k < t (a) and that λ k is not equal to any critical time forL, i.e.,λ p < λ k <λ p+1 for some p. Then it follows from Lemma 3.3 that at time t = λ k , if e i 1 for i ∈ N \ {1} becomes saturated, then e i 1 belongs to sat(x * t ) and the new (nonsaturated) e i 1 satisfies e i 1 iēi 1 . (Here we employ Lemma 3.3 by restricting the polymatroid to E \ {a} since a is not saturated for x * t with t < t (a).) Hence (a) holds for t = λ k and then so does for all t ∈ [0, min{λ k+1 ,λ p+1 , t (a)}).
(B) Suppose that (a) holds for all t ∈ [0,λ k ) for some k ≥ 1 withλ k < t (a) and that λ p <λ k < λ p+1 for some p. Then at time t =λ k we have sat(x * t ) enlarged and newly saturatedē i 1 is replaced Proof. Suppose that |N P (e)| 1 for all e ∈ E. Recall that for each e ∈ E, t (e) is the time when good e is exhausted (or saturated). Also, for each e ∈ E and i ∈ N P (e), t i 0 (e) is the time when agent i starts eating good e (or the time when e becomes the top element of current L i ).
For the solution P, if P (1, a) = 0 for some a ∈ E, shifting good a in L 1 toward the end of L 1 does not change the solution P. Hence we can assume ( †) goods e with P (1, e) > 0 appear consecutively in L 1 from the top of L 1 . Now suppose that for agent 1 ∈ N her preference is given by
with P (1, a) > 0 and she misreports her preference as
with some integer s ≥ 1. LetP be the PS solution obtained under the misreport. When L 1 is replaced byL 1 , we denote t (e) and t i 0 (e) byt (e) andt i 0 (e), respectively, for all e ∈ E and i ∈ N , and also denote x * t byx * t . Suppose thatP 1 sd-dominates P 1 or is equal to P 1 (i.e.,P 1 sd 1 P 1 ), where recallP 1 = (P (1, e) | e ∈ E) and P 1 = (P (1, e) | e ∈ E). Then it suffices to proveP 1 = P 1 .
(I) Suppose thatt (a) > t (a). Then from Lemma 6.1 (d) and Lemma 6.2 we havē
Now, sincet (a) > t (a) and N P (a) \ {1} ∅ by the assumption, it follows from (47) and (48) that P (1, a) < P (1, a) , a contradiction. Hence we havet (a) ≤ t (a) and
Since from the assumption thatP 1 sd 1 P 1 we must haveP (1, a) ≥ P (1, a), it follows from (49) that
The latter relation in (50) implies -elements z 1 , . . . , z s are saturated at time t = 0 forL.
Since shifting elements z 1 , . . . , z s toward the end ofL 1 does not changeP, it suffices to consider that L 1 andL 1 are given as
for some {z 1 , . . . , z s } ⊆ E \ {a, b} with an integer s ≥ 0.
(II) If P (1, b) = 0, then it easily follows from the assumption ( †) that P 1 =P 1 . Hence suppose P (1, b) > 0. Then by the same arguments as in (I), using Lemma 6.2 again, we can show (III) Further repeating this argument, we can show thatP 1 = P 1 . Theorem 6.3 is rephrased as follows. (Note that matrix P ∈ R N ×E has the row set N and the column set E.)
-If no column of P contains exactly one nonzero entry, the extended PS solution P computed by Algorithm 1 is a weak Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.3 has very useful practical implications from the point of view of strategy-proofness. The condition that |N P (e)| 1 (∀e ∈ E) is very likely to be satisfied when the number |N | of "agents" is significantly large, compared with the number |E| of "types of goods" such as the assignment of students to courses.
Weak Strategy-Proofness in Case of Unit Demands and Matroidal Supplies
We show that when the polymatroid (E, ρ) is a matroid and agents have unit demands, the extended PS mechanism (Algorithm 1) is weakly strategy-proof, where the matroidal {0, 1} property plays a crucial role. Consider the random assignment problem
) and suppose that the underlying polymatroid (E, ρ) is a matroid and agents have unit demands, i.e., d = 1. We assume that ρ (E) = |N |.
Lemma 6.4. Suppose that L 1 andL 1 are given by (35) and (36) and that P (1, a) 
Proof. Because of Theorem 6.3, it suffices to consider the case where |N P (a)| = 1. Suppose that L 1 andL 1 are given by (35) and (36) and that P (1, a) > 0.
Suppose |N P (a)| = 1, i.e., N P (a) = {a}. From Lemma 6.2 we have
If |NP (a)| ≥ 2, then the last inequality in (53) should hold with strict inequality. Hence it suffices to consider the case where |NP (a)| = 1 = |N P (a)|. Moreover, sincet (a) > t (a) by the assumption, it follows from (53) thatP least one agent i ∈ N \ {1} forL t (as well as for L t ) at time t = t (a).) Hence, ifx *
(a), then from (55) and (56) we havē
a contradiction. We thus haveP (1, a) =x * t (a) (a) < x * t (a) (a) = P (1, a) . Case (ii): (Z \ {a}) \ X = ∅. In this case, it follows from (55) that
where note that X ∪ Z = X ∪ {a} and P (1, a) > 0. It follows from (54) thatP
It should be noted that the above proof in Case (ii) depends on the matroidal {0, 1} property. Theorem 6.5. When the underlying polymatroid (E, ρ) is a matroid and agents have unit demands, the extended PS mechanism given by Algorithm 1 is weakly strategy-proof.
Proof. The present theorem can be shown similarly as Theorem 6.3, based on Lemma 6.4.
DESIGNING A LOTTERY
Now we examine how to compute an expression of the solution P, obtained by Algorithm 1, as a convex combination of integral (possibly extreme) points Q (k ) (k ∈ K) of Conv(A) as follows:
We will show that we can always compute a required convex combination representation (59) in an efficient way (see Algorithm 2 given in Section 7.2). With the aid of polymatroidal results achieved in References [8-10, 16, 24] we can construct a lottery to attain P by finding the expression as in (59).
Computing the Probability Distribution
The proposed Algorithm 2 for efficiently computing an expression (59) is basically a standard procedure to obtain an expression of a given point in a polytope P * by a convex combination of its extreme points, 10 but it is crucial how efficiently we can compute an end point of the intersection of a line and a base polytope [16, 24] and can identify the unique minimal face of P * containing any given point in P * [10] .
Put P * = Conv(A). For the expected allocation matrix P (or independent flow φ P ) and base x * P ∈ B(ρ) computed by Algorithm 1 we first consider the unique minimal face of P * containing φ P .
Denote by D (x * P ) the set of all tight sets for x * P in B(ρ), where D (x * P ) is closed with respect to the binary operations of set union and intersection and is a distributive lattice, due to Lemma 3.1 (also see Reference [10] ). Let a maximal chain of D (x * P ) be given bŷ
10 This is an adaptation of a standard procedure for finding an expression of a given point x in a relative interior of a polytope P as a convex combination of extreme points of P . First find an extreme point y and extend a half-line from y through x as far as we reach a boundary point z in a minimal face F (containing z) of P . Since x is expressed as a convex combination of y and z, a desired convex combination expression can be obtained if z is expressed as a convex combination of extreme points of face F , a polytope of dimension smaller than P . Here note that z is within the relative interior of face F because of the minimality of face F . We thus have a required algorithm.
The chain of tight sets obtained during the execution of Algorithm 1 is a subchain of (60). A maximal chainĈ is determined by the dependence structure associated with dep(x * P , e) for all e ∈ E and can be computed in strongly polynomial time [10] .
For each q = 1, . . . ,p consider the minor, denoted by P q , of polymatroid (E, ρ) obtained by its restriction toŜ q followed by the contraction ofŜ q−1 . The minor P q is the polymatroid onT q ≡ S q \Ŝ q−1 with the rank function ρ q given by
Also denote by x * q the restriction of x * P toT q (=Ŝ q \Ŝ q−1 ). Then x * q is a base of the polymatroid (T q , ρ q ), i.e., x * q ∈ B(ρ q ). Note that x * P is a base of the direct sum ⊕ p q=1 P q of minors P q (q = 1, . . . ,p). Letρ be the rank function of polymatroid ⊕ p q=1 P q . It should be noted that because of the maximality of chainĈ, for each q = 1, . . . ,p the base polyhedron B(ρ q ) ⊆ RT q is of dimension |T q | − 1 and base x * q is within the relative interior of B(ρ q ) and that x * P is within the relative interior of the base polyhedron B(ρ) of ⊕ 
Then, define a face of P * containing φ P by P * (φ P ) = {φ ∈ P * | ∀i ∈Î : ∂ + φ(i) = d (i), ∀a ∈Â 0 : φ(a) = 0, ∂ − φ ∈ B(ρ)}.
We can show the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1. The polytope P * (φ P ) is the unique minimal face of P * containing φ P .
Proof. In the system of inequalities (and equations) that defines P * , the given φ P satisfies ∂ + φ P (i) = d (i) for all i ∈Î , φ P (a) = 0 for all a ∈Â 0 , and
which includes all the inequalities for P * satisfied with equality by φ P . Note that the equations in (66) are implied by ∂ − φ P (X ) = ρ (X ) (∀X ∈ C(x * P )),
since D (x * P ) is a distributive lattice and ρ is modular on D (x * P ). Also note that the system of equations (67) together with ∂ − φ P ∈ B(ρ) is equivalent to ∂ − φ P ∈ B(ρ). Hence Equation (65) defines the unique minimal face of P * containing φ P .
We can easily see that polytope P * (φ P ) given by Equation (65) is the set of feasible flows of value ρ (E) in another independent flow network, which we denote byN φ P . HereN φ P consists of the bipartite graph G = (S + , S − ; A) with S + = N , S − = E, and A = N × E, a capacity function c : A → R ≥0 withĉ (a) = 0 (a ∈Â 0 ) andĉ (a) = c (a) (a ∈Â + ), a polymatroid (E,ρ) on S − = E, and a polymatroid on S + = N given by the direct sum of polymatroids (Î,ρ 1 ) and (N \Î ,ρ 2 ) withρ 1 (X ) = d (X ) for X ⊆Î andρ 2 (X ) = min{d (X ), ρ (E) − d (Î )} for X ⊆ N \Î , whereÂ 0 ,Â + , andÎ are defined by Equations (62)-(64).
Randomized Mechanism
We begin with base x * 1 ≡ x * P ∈ B(ρ) and independent flowφ 1 ≡ φ P in networkN φ P such that x * 1 = ∂ −φ 1 . If φ P is already integer-valued, we are done. Hence we assume that φ P is not integer-valued. Perform the following procedure to compute an expression (59). Here recall that an N × E matrix P and a flow φ P : N × E → R are identified with each other. the set of assignment matrices Q (s ) (s = 1, . . . , t + 1). Note that Equation (74) is equivalent to
which thus can be computed in strongly polynomial time. Now we have the following procedure:
Randomized_Mechanism
Step 1: Compute P by using Algorithm 1.
Step 2: Compute an expression (59) by using Algorithm 2.
Step 3: Choose an allocation from among Q (k ) (k ∈ K) by the lottery with the probability distribution ν k (k ∈ K).
Consequently, we have shown the following theorem:
Theorem 7.2. By using Algorithm 1 to find the expected allocation matrix P and using Algorithm 2 to construct a lottery realizing P, Randomized_Mechanism generates a feasible integral allocation in strongly polynomial time whose expectation is equal to the desired solution P.
It should be noted that defining u = ∂ − φ P and u = ∂ − φ P , we may replace the original base polyhedron B(ρ) by its vector minor (the restriction by u and the contraction by u)
where for any real z z and z are, respectively, the integer z * nearest to z satisfying z * ≤ z and z ≤ z * , and for any x ∈ R E x = ( x (e) | e ∈ E) and x = ( x (e) | e ∈ E). Also we define lower and upper capacities c and c on arcs in A as c (a) = φ P (a) and c (a) = φ P (a) for all a ∈ A, and consider the independent flows with these capacities and base polyhedron B(ρ) u u . Then, we can adapt the procedure, Algorithm 2, to the independent flow network modified above and the obtained Q (k ) (k ∈ K ) become closer to P than those obtained for the original network N . This may give a favorable lottery in practice, especially for a polymatroid (E, ρ) with large ρ (E) or d (N ).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have considered the random assignment problem with submodular constraints on goods and have shown the following:
(1) Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 that the PS mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] can naturally be extended to give an ordinally efficient and normalized envy-free solution for polymatroidal constraints. (2) A sufficient condition (Theorem 6.3) that guarantees that the computed PS solution is a weak Nash equilibrium, which is very likely to be satisfied for practical problems with a large number of agents. (3) Weak strategy-proofness (Theorem 6.5) of the extended PS mechanism in case of unit demands and matroidal supplies.
In our earlier article [12] , we investigated the random assignment problem with matroidal constraints in more details, where we examined a characterization of the extended PS solution by min-cost independent flows and by lexicographic optimality, which we have omitted here.
